Vol 9 2005 the edinburgh law review subject can be found in other, earlier writings of mine. 4 Instead, I intend here to look at Cooper's historical work in its own historical context, and in its relation to his other contributions to thought about Scots law, especially to Scottish legal nationalism.
Nearly thirty years ago, on what appeared to be the eve of devolution of legislative power to a Scottish Assembly, Ian Willock published a paper, entitled "The Scottish Legal Heritage Revisited", in which he argued that Scots law had been fitted out with an ideology since the Second World War. 5 This ideology had two prime begetters. One was Professor T B (later Sir Thomas) Smith. The other was Lord Cooper, who had been Smith's guide and mentor. What Willock therefore dubbed "the Cooper-Smith ideology" could be summarised broadly as follows. Modern Scots private law was a "mixed" system, in which a basically Civilian structure had been overlaid since the Union of 1707 by influence from the English Common Law, through the agencies of Westminster, UK government departments in Whitehall, the common appeal court in the House of Lords, and the ignorance and apathy of Scots lawyers. The English influence had almost never been for the good. Scots law could only be saved by drawing upon its own historical roots and the experience of other "mixed" systems, such as those of South Africa and Louisiana, where too a basically Civilian system was threatened by infiltration from alien traditions. Since Willock wrote, there has been much debate about and discussion of the "Cooper-Smith ideology" in Scotland, with supporters and critics in more or less equal measure. 6 My own contribution to date has been to confirm what others have also noted, that many elements of the "Cooper-Smith ideology" can actually be found in articulate existence long before the Second World War: a particularly striking statement of it is the manifesto of the Stair Society, published in 1934. 7 Further, Cooper himself appears to have formulated most of the elements of the ideology between 1945 and 1949, before Smith made his bow in legal literature, and the latter seems to have seen himself as picking up the former's standard after his death in 1955, rather than as having been an equal partner in its creation. But further, despite his involvement in the founding of the Stair Society, Cooper [T]his project may pave the way to an expansion of beneficent activities in many directions-leading, perhaps, with the assistance of the universities and the legal societies, to an improved system of legal education, to large-scale legal reforms, and eventually to a Scottish legal renaissance … What is also apparent is that, while Cooper was clearly always interested in the history of the law, the medieval law with which he would later be strongly associated did not attract him initially. His few early writings on, or references to, history are concerned, conventionally enough, with the Institutional Writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Stair, Erskine and Bell), and praise the way in which they developed the law to meet the needs of their times (i.e., did what he thought lawyers of his own day should be doing). There is here a rich and almost unexplored field for the investigator -the law of Scotland as it was before it became deeply permeated by the law of Rome, the Canon Law, and the law of the feus. … There is indeed a sense in which Stair is open to the criticism which Dutch lawyers have directed against Grotius and Voet-that he enslaved his country to an alien system, or at least that he largely discarded or ignored its native rules, and sought to break the natural continuity of their development.
The significance of this quotation is Cooper's recognition that there had been a Scots law before Stair, and that it might be more truly indigenous-and therefore closer to, or more reflective of, the authentic spirit of the Scottish people-than the law after it had been "Civilian-ised" in the institutional texts. In later years, Cooper was to point out how it was Craig, writing in his Jus feudale at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and Stair, who had been the first to denounce Regiam as a work of plagiarism and damn it as therefore an inauthentic source of Scots law. Cooper's phrasing of his account of this is again significant: Craig's distaste for the historical method and his preference for expounding law as a cosmopolitan system must in any event have predisposed him against the surviving relics of medieval Scots Law … Under [his] sweeping condemnation Stair evidently included not only Regiam Majestatem but everything else bearing on the history of his country's institutions, for he hardly spares them a second glance. His judgment might have carried more weight if he had been consistent in founding on principle and ignoring history; but it forfeits much of its value when we find him laboriously tracing the origins of civilian doctrines to their roots in Roman antiquities, and tracking legal doctrines to a farfetched source in the Old Testament or the classics of Greece and Rome. It was probably on this account that the later institutional and other writers, though ready to sit submissively at the feet of Stair when he was expounding legal doctrine, tacitly ignored his pronouncements on legal history.
Cooper goes on, in the publication from which this quotation is taken, to point out the continuing acceptance of Regiam in legal practice despite Craig and Stair; while his own implicit criticism of preference for cosmopolitan systems of law and lack of interest in native institutions and their history is surely indicative of the author's views on such matters in general. Certainly it is another sign that in the 1930s he was not wholly in sympathy with the ideology that has since come to be associated with his name.
The realisation that Scots law had a possibly "native" or non-Roman history before Stair, I suggest, is what led Cooper to further researches into medieval law in the years after 1936, work which in some sense culminated in his editions of Regiam and Quoniam, published by the Stair Society in a single volume in 1947. 18 But the fruits of these researches did not begin to appear until after he was raised to the bench in 1941, when perhaps he began to have a little more leisure time than the role of Lord Advocate had allowed.
His first medieval paper appeared in the Juridical Review at the beginning of 1943: it was a study of an early thirteenth-century litigation between Melrose Abbey and the Earl of Dunbar, based mainly upon the material contained in the charters of the abbey as printed in the nineteenth century. 19 This was a precursor of a short book which appeared in 1944, entitled Select Scottish Cases of the Thirteenth Century, performing a similar exercise for some 79 litigations conducted between 1200 and 1300. He described this work as the product of an experiment testing the extent to which the law in practice reflected the law described in Regiam. By the middle of the thirteenth century Scottish lawyers were already deeply imbued with the methods of the Curia Romana and the Romano-Canonical procedure and had thereby become habituated to the civilian idiom of legal thinking and to a habit of mind which led to reasoning from principles to instances, to reliance upon syllogisms rather than precedents, and to concentration not upon remedies but on rights and duties. Such characteristics have been typical of Scots law throughout its later history and persist strongly to this day. Under such influences it would only be natural that from the time of Alexander III onwards the Scottish lawyers, nearly all of whom were then ecclesiastics, would view with instinctive distaste the later trend of English developments and particularly the empirical effort to contrive a new tool for every job, to use that tool only for that job, and to circumvent occasional obstacles by legal fictions. Crucial to this analysis was the date of composition of Regiam Majestatem, the most important work of medieval Scots law, but one which, as already noted, drew extensively on the late twelfth-century English work, Glanvill. Cooper's tests of Regiam against the evidence of contemporary practice as expressed in cases and legislation led him to conclude that Regiam had been produced around 1230, just before Scoto-Norman law began to diverge notably from the Anglo-Norman law set out in Glanvill. There were signs within Regiam, notably in its incorporation of Romano-canonical material, of the incipient Scoto-Norman law, but in essence the text belonged to the period when Scots law still relied heavily upon English law for its development.
Cooper's analysis also shows that he had largely given up on any idea of medieval law as representing a "pure" native tradition (although he would observe in 1949 that the then still-surviving feudal land law was the most "distinctively Scottish" branch of Scots law which had evolved "without the intrusion of alien influence for some eight hundred years" 27 ). Early legal development was essentially dependent upon English law, while Scoto-Norman law was the product of mixing those early developments with the influence of Canon law. Cooper found the native tradition lying rather in lawyers' attitude or approach to law and its development. There never had been much indigenous Scots law; it had always developed by borrowing from other systems; and that borrowing had been characterised by "effort … to attain simplicity, flexibility and directness, and to attain these things systematically"; or to use the smallest number possible of legal tools to do the largest number of jobs.
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The link between this historical interpretation and the "ideology" which Cooper also began to develop during and immediately after the Second World War becomes apparent when considering the view of comparative law which he also began to promulgate at this time. 29 Vol 9 2005 the edinburgh law review created a lectureship in comparative law, the first of its kind in Scotland. 31 In the lecture, Cooper emphasised the especial importance of comparative law in the development and reform of the Scottish legal system, in which so "little … could justly be described as aboriginal and indigenous" and so much "can be traced to an alien source". 32 On 10 October 1947 Cooper addressed another university audience, this time in Edinburgh, on "The Future of the Legal Profession". Amongst other points, he commended his listeners to follow the example of Aberdeen in establishing a lectureship in Comparative Law, "for the Scottish lawyer has been first and foremost a comparative lawyer since the thirteenth century, and when he ceases to be a comparative lawyer Scots Law will die." 34 Originally published in French, an English translation by F P Walton appeared in the main Scottish academic law journal, the Juridical Review, in 1925. 35 In the lecture Lévy-Ullmann had discussed the varied historical sources and development of Scots law, drawing attention in particular to Roman, feudal and English influences. He summarised his overall view of the law as follows:
[I]t is a law of Roman and feudal origin which has been adapted in the course of eight centuries by legislation and by judicial decisions to the needs of the Scottish people, and during the last century has, little by little, been combining with the English law by a slow operation of fusion. … [The adaptation has been carried out] with extraordinary skill. In the whole field of private law the Scots have revealed themselves admirable makers and adapters of laws.
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Lévy-Ullmann's lecture has become famous, at least amongst Scots lawyers, for the statement that "Scots law as it stands gives us a picture of what will be some day (perhaps at the end of this century) the law of the civilised nations, namely a combination between the Anglo-Saxon system and the continental system". was inspired, as were other Scots lawyers, by Lévy-Ullmann's notion that looking outside itself for inspiration-adapting other people's laws-was the hallmark of Scots law and Scots lawyers. For Cooper, history as thus objectively verified from outside the system provided a lesson for today.
There was, of course, nothing new in Cooper's discovery of the influence of English law on the early development of Scots law. In some shape or form this had been known since the time of Craig, 38 and it had been discussed by later writers such as Lords Bankton 39 and Kames, 40 Walter Ross, 41 James Paterson, 42 and Cosmo Innes. 43 In Cooper's own lifetime, it was established orthodoxy that the history of Scots law to 1300 had involved a close relationship with English developments. In 1890 George Neilson thought that "marked English influence" could be detected in legal development after the capture of William, king of Scots, by the English at Alnwick in 1174, and dated Regiam to around 1230 upon comparing its contents with evidence of Scottish legal practice. 44 In the History of English Law, first published in 1893, F W Maitland observed that although English law "had no power north of the Tweed … we may doubt whether a man who crossed the river felt that he had passed from the land of one law to the land of another", and continued: "It seems clear enough from abundant evidence that, at the outbreak of the war of independence, the law of Scotland … was closely akin to English law." 45 Giving the Storrs Lectures at Yale in October 1895, Professor John Dove Wilson of Aberdeen appears to have been the first to coin the phrase "Scoto-Norman" to describe the law of the thirteenth century; and he also argued that "at the beginning of the fourteenth century, there must have been a great similarity between the laws of England and Scotland". 46 He accordingly placed Regiam at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and further maintained that there was no trace of Roman law in Scotland until much later, when there was a Reception akin to that of Germany in the sixteenth century. Any Roman law in Regiam was mere ornamental matter, and the influence of Roman law in the Church courts affected only the law in which the church had exclusive jurisdiction, such as marriage and legitimacy. 47 The close identity of Scots and English law around 1300 was, then, the orthodoxy firmly established in the 1890s when Cooper was in his childhood, 48 and it can be found accepted in the pre-1939 writing of such contemporaries as Lords Dunedin, 49 Macmillan, 50 and Normand, 51 Professors James Mackintosh, 52 John
Spencer Muirhead, 53 and Andrew Dewar Gibb, 54 and E J MacGillivray, who contributed an article on the influence of English law to the Stair Society's first volume. 55 What was different or original in Cooper's analysis? It lay essentially in bringing forward to a much earlier point in time the divergence of Scots from English law and in highlighting the importance of Canon as well as English law in this process. So almost from the very beginning Scots law was a mixed system, developing by borrowing from other, more powerful legal cultures, but increasingly doing so in a selective and critical way. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that each pursuer eventually presented himself before the tribunal in the guise of "an infant crying in the night, And with no language but a cry", and that the whole of Scots law had been compressed into a single commandment: "Thou shalt do na wrang!" … This was unquestionably the period when Scots Law, viewed as a science and a philosophy from the comparative standpoint, reached its lowwater mark.
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His explanation for the decline and fall of later medieval Scots law went as follows:
At the risk of inviting the retort that there is nothing like leather, I make bold to assert the main source of the trouble was the persistent policy of confiding the judicial function to an unpaid, part-time, lay magistracy, masquerading as judges and engaging casually in the discharge of judicial duties in intervals snatched from their major preoccupations as territorial magnates, or statesmen, or ecclesiastical dignitaries. … [T]he executive remained so impotent and the courts so inferior in capacity and efficiency for so prolonged a period that they gradually dragged the substantive law down to their own level.
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Only the creation of the Court of Session and the genius of one of its PresidentsStair-would ultimately save Scots law from the extinction which otherwise must have followed after the Union of 1707.
Once again, therefore, we see Cooper's concerns about the present-a world in which increasingly judicial tasks were assigned, not to the professional courts, but to administrative tribunals or, in the private sector, to arbitration-reflected in his history; and his use of history to make points about the implications of the current state of affairs as he saw it. He had, as already noted, expressed these concerns eloquently in the 1930s; and he went on expressing them after the Second World War.
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Much of Cooper's work on medieval law was, therefore, deeply affected by the concerns about current law and development which he had expressed before 1939. His legal history contained a message for his own times and for the fellow lawyers he conceived as his principal audience. As he put it in The Scottish Legal Tradition in 1949:
The fertilising foreign contacts, upon which Scots Law has thrived for ages, can only with difficulty be maintained, and there is a visible risk that the old breadth of vision may be succeeded by an insular parochialism and a disposition to rest content with our inherited capital of ideas. The dangers of these tendencies are appreciated within the legal profession, and they can and will be resisted. If they were not, the future of Scots Law would soon lie behind it. But the medieval research did also lead Cooper to some new and useful insights into the development of Scots law from its beginnings in the twelfth century. More importantly for present purposes, it also enabled him to begin to join up his earlier thought with that of others who had promulgated Scots law as a Civilian or mixed system, with all that this entailed by way of positioning the law for further development in the future. These were the historical and comparative foundations upon which, for good or ill, Cooper's own contribution to the Cooper-Smith ideology would be built, with all its implications for Scottish legal nationalism.
